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In Bank. May 25, 1965.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES EDWARDS WASHINGTON, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Homicide-First Degree Murder-Intent.-Except when the
common-Iaw-felony-murder doctrine applies, an essential element of murder is an intent to kill or an intent, with conscious
disregard for life, to commit acts likely to kill.
[2] Id.-First Degree Murder-Killing in Perpetration of Felony.
-The felony-murder doctrine ascribes malice aforethought to
the felon who kills in the perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony.
[3] Id.-First Degree Murder-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery.
-When a killing is not committed by a robber or by his accomplice, but by his victim, malice aforethought is not attributable to the robber, for the killing is not committed by him in
the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate robbery.
[4] Id.-First Degree Murder-Killing in Perpetration of Felony.
-Pen. Code, § 189, making a killing in the perpetration of
certain felonies first degree murder, requires that a felon or his
accomplice commit the killing, for if he does not, the killing is
not committed to perpetrate the felony; to include within
§ 189 a killing committed by a victim to thwart a robbery would
expand the meaning of the words "murder . . . which is committed in the perpetration . . . [of] robbery • • ." beyond
common understanding.
[6] Id.-First Degree Murder-Killing in Perpetration of Felony.
-The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons
from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly
responsible for killings they commit; this purpose is not served
by punishing them for killings committed by their victims.
[6] Id.-First Degree Murder-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery.
-Neither the common-law rationale of the felony-murder rule
[1] See Ca.l ..Tur.2d, Homicide, §§ 86, 87; Am ..Tur., Homicide (1st
cd § 34).
[3] Homicide in commission of felony where the killing was the
act of one not a participant in the felony, note, 12 A.L.R.2d 210.
See also Ca1..Tur.2d, Homicide, § 77; Am ..Tur., Homicide (1st ed
§ 39).
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 15(1); [2-6, 8, 12]
Homicide, § 15 (6); [7, 11] Homicide, § 4; [9] Homicide, § 11;
[10] Homicide, § 6; [13] Robbery, § 32; [14] Criminal Law, § 840.
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nor the Penal Code supports the eontention that a purpose of
the rule is to prevent the commission of robberies.
[7] Id.-Pa.rticipation in 01fense Resulting in Homicide.-A defendant need not be the killer to be guilty of murder; he may
be vicariously responsible under rules defining principals and
criminal conspiracies.
[8] Id.-First Degree Murder-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery.
-All persons aiding and abetting the commission of n robbery
are guilty of first degree murder when one of them kills while
acting in furtherance of the common design.
[9] Id.-Murder.-When defendant intends to kill or intentionally
commits, with a conscious disregard for life, acts that are
likely to kill, he is guilty of murder though he uses another
person to accomplish his objective.
[10] Id.-Participation in 01fense Resulting in Homicide-Liability for Death of Coconspirator.-Defendants who initiate gun
battles may be found guilty of murder if their victims resist
and kill, and it is unnecessary to imply malice by invoking
. the felony-murder doctrine.
[11] Id.-Participation in 01fense Resulting in Homicide.-To invoke the felony-murder doctrine to imply malice when defendants initiate a gun battle and the victim resists and kills
another is unnecessary and overlooks the principles of criminal
liability governing one person's responsibility for a killing
committed by another.
[12] Id.-First Degree Murder-Killing in Perpetration of Felony.
-The felony-murder rule (Pen. Code, § 189) should not be
extended beyond its rational function, and for defendant to
be guilty of murder under that rule, the killing must be committed by defendant or his accomplice acting in furtherance
of their common design. (Disapproving inconsistent language
in People v. Harrison, 176 Cal.App.2d 330 [1 Cal.Rptr. 414].)
[18] Robbery-Evidence-Participation in 01fense.-The evidence
sufficed to support defendant's conviction of robbery where,
though his testimony that he was drunk and asleep in the ear
when the robbery took place was corroborated, the victim
identified defendant as a participant in the robbery.
[14] Oriminal Law-Instructions-Oredibility of Prosecuting Witness.-In a prosecution for robbery and murder, the trial court
was not required, on its own motion, to instruct the jury to
view the testimony of the alleged robbery victim with caution,
on the ground that he was relieved of responsibility for the
shooting of defendant's accomplice by implicating defendant
in an attempted robbery, where defendant had a fair opportunity to controvert the witness' testimony and the court properly instructed the jurors that they were the exclusive judges
of the credibility of witnesses and informed them that they

May 1965]

PEOPLE

v.

WASHINGTON

(62 C.2d 777; 44 Cal.Rptr. 4t2. 402 P.2d 110]

779

might consider such matters as the relation of the witnesses
to the case and their interest therein.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. John
G. Barnes, Judge. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed
in part; appeal from order dismissed.
Prosecution for robbery and murder. Judgment affirmed as
to conviction of first degree robbery and reversed as to conviction of first degree murder.
Erling J. Hovden, Public Defender, Paul G. Breckenridge,
Jr., and James L. McCormick, Deputy Public Defenders, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attorneys General,
William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Gordon
Ringer, Deputy Attorney General, for) Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of
conviction entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of
first degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 211a) and first degree
murder and :fixing the murder penalty at life imprisonment.
(Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189, 190, 190.1.) 1 . He was convicted of
murd.er for participating in a robbery in which his accomplice was killed by the victim of the robbery.
Shortly before 10 p.m., October 2, 1962, Johnnie Carpenter
prepared to close his gasoline station. He was in his office
computing the receipts and disbursements of the day while
an attendant in an adjacent storage room deposited money
in a vault. Upon hearing someone yell" robbery," Carpenter
opened his desk and took out a revolver. A few moments later,
James Ball entered the office and pointed a revolver directly
at Carpenter, who fired immediately, mortally wounding Ball.
Carpenter then hurried to the door and saw an unarmed
man he later identified as defendant running from the vault
with a moneybag in his right hand. He shouted "Stop."
When his warning was not heeded, he fired and hit defendant who fell wounded in front of the station.
The Attorney General, relying on People v. Harrison, 176
1 Defendant'8 appeal from the nonappealable order denying a new
trial is dismissed. (Pen. Code, § 1237, Bubd. 2.)
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Cal.App.2d 330 [1 Cal.Rptr. 414], contends that defendant
was properly convicted of first degree murder. In that case
defendants initiated a gun battle with an employee in an
attempt to rob a cleaning business. In the crossfire, the
employee accidentally killed the owner of the business. The
court affirmed the judgment convicting defendants of first
degree murder, invoking Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa.
596 [68 A.2d 595, 12 A.L.R.2d 183], and People v. Podolski,
332 Mich. 508 [52 N.W.2d 201], which held that robbers who
provoked gunfire were guilty of first degree murder even
though the lethal bullet was fired by a policeman.
Defendant would distinguish the Harrison, Almeida, and
Podolski cases on the ground that in each instance the person
killed was an innocent victim, not one of the felons. He
suggests that we limit the rule of the Harrison case just as
the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and Michigan have limited the Almeida and Podolski cases by holding that surviving felons are not guilty of murder when their accomplices
are killed by persons resisting the felony. (Commonwealth
v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486 [137 A.2d 472]; People v. Austin,
370 Mich. 12 [120 N.W.2d 766]; see also People v. Wood~
8 N.Y.2d 48 [201 N.Y.S.2d 328, 167 N.E.2d 736].) A distinction based on the person killed, however, would make
the defendant's criminal liability turn upon the marksmanship of victims and policemen. A rule of law cannot reasonably be based on such a fortuitous circumstance. The basic
issue therefore is whether a robber can be convicted of murder
for the killing of any person by another who is resisting the
robbery.
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with
malice aforethought." (Pen. Code, § 187.) [1] Except
when the common-Iaw-felony-murder doctrine is applicable,
an essential element of murder is an intent to kill or an
intent with conscious disregard for life to commit acts likely
to kill. (See People v. Thomas, 41 Cal.2d 470, 475 [261 P.2d
1] [concurring opinion].) [2] The felony-murder doctrine ascribes malice aforethought to the felon who kills in
the perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony. (People
v. Ford, 60 Cal.2d 772, 795 [36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892] ;
People v. Coefield, 37 Ca1.2d 865, 868 [236 P.2d 570].) That
doctrine is incorporated in section 189 of the Penal Code,
which provides in part: "All murder ... committed in the
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate ... robbery ... is murder of the first degree.' , Thus, even though section 189
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speaks only of degrees of "murder," inadvertent or accidental
killings are first degree murders when committed by felons
in the perpetration of robbery. (People v. Coefield, supra,
37 Cal.2d 865, 868; People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 249 [290
P. 881].)
[3] When a killing is not committed by a robber or by
his accomplice but by his victim, malice aforethought is not
attributable to the robber, for the killing is not committed
by him in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate robbery.
It is not enough that the killing was a risk reasonably to
be foreseen and that the robbery might therefore be regarded
as a proximate cause of the killing. [4] Section 189 requires that the felon or his accomplice commit the killing,
for if he does not, the killing is not committed to perpetrate
the felony. Indeed, in the present case the killing was committed to thwart a felony. To include such killings within
section 189 would expand the meaning of the words "murder
... which is committed in the perpetration... [of] robbery ... "
beyond common understanding.
[6] The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter
. felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding
them strictly responsible for killings they commit. (See
Holmes, The Common Law, pp. 58-59; Model Penal Code
(Tent. Draft No.9, May 8, 1959) § 201.2, comment 4 at pp.
37 -38; Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Cmd. No. 8932, at pp. 35-36 (1949-1953).) This purpose
is not served by punishing them for killings committed by
their victims.
[6] It is contended, however, that another purpose of the
felony-murder rule is to prevent the commission of robberies.
Neither the common-law rationale of the rule nor the Penal
Code supports this contention. In every robbery there is a
possibility that the victim will resist and kill. The robber
has little control over such a killing once the robbery is
undertaken as this case demonstrates. To impose an additional penalty for the killing would discriminate between
robbers, not on the basis of any difference in their own conduct, but solely on the basis of the response by others that
the robber's conduct happened to induce. An additional
penalty for a homicide committed by the victim would deter
robbery haphazardly at best. To "prevent stealing, [the
law] would do better to hang one thief in every thousand by
lot." (Holmes, The Common Law, p. 58.)
[7] A defendant need not do the killing himself, however,

I
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to be guilty of murder. He may be vicariously responsible
under the rules defining principals and criminal conspiracies.
[8] All persons aiding and abetting the commission of a
robbery are guilty of first degree murder when one of them
kills while acting in furtherance of the common design.
(People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 249 [290 P. 881] ; People v.
Kauffman, 152 Cal. 331, 334 [92 P. 861].) [9] Moreover,
when the defendant intends to kill or intentionally commits
acts that are likely to kill with a conscious disregard for life,
he is guilty of murder even though he uses another person
to accomplish his objective. (Johnson v. State, 142 Ala. 70
[38 So. 182, 2 L.R.A. N.S. 897]; see also Wilson v. State,
188 Ark. 846 [68 S.W.2d 100] ; Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 564 [55 S.W. 961].)
[10] Defendants who initiate gun battles may also be
found guilty of murder if their victims resist and kill. Under
such circumstances, ' , the defendant for a base, antisocial
motive and with wanton disregard for human life, does
an act that involves a high degree of probability that it will
result in death" (People v. Thomas, 41 Cal.2d 470, 480 [261
P.2d 1] [concurring opinion), and it is unnecessary to
imply malice by invoking the felony-murder doctrine. 2
[11] To invoke the felony-murder doctrine to imply malice
in such a case is unnecessary and overlooks the principles of
criminal liability that should govern the responsibility of
one person for a killing committed by another. (See Hart
and Honore, Causation in the Law, pp. 296-299; Hall, Criminal Law, 2d ed., pp. 270-281; Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U.Pa.L.Rev. 50; Brett,
An Inquiry Into Criminal Guilt, pp. 123-124.)
To invoke the felony-murder doctrine when the killing is
not committed by the defendant or by his accomplice could
lead to absurd results. Thus, two men rob a grocery store
and :flee in opposite directions. The owner of the store follows
one of the robbers and kills him. Neither robber may have
fired a shot. Neither robber may have been armed with a
deadly weapon. If the felony-murder doctrine applied, how20 ne scholar has commented that "People v. Harrison, 176 Cal.App.2d
330, 1 Cal.Rptr. 414 (1959). is probably not, strictly speaking, a felonymurder ease at all, but rather a case taking a very relaxed view of the
necessary causal connection between the defendant's act and the victim's
death, an approach which is possible quite independent of the felonymurder rule." (Packer, The Case for ReviBion of the Penal Code, 13
S~.L.Rev. 252, 259, fn. 39.)
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ever, the surviving robber could be convicted of first degree
murder (see Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639 [117
A.2d 204], overruled by Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa.
486 [137 A.2d 472]), even though he was captured by a
policeman and placed under arrest at the time his accomplice
was killed. (Commonwealth v. Doris, 287 Pa. 547 [135 A. 313] ;
see People v. Corkery, 134 Cal.App. 294 [25 P.2d 257].)
The felony-murder rule has been criticized on the grounds
that in almost all cases in which it is applied it is unnecessary
and that it erodes the relation between criminal liability and
moral culpability. (See e.g., Model Penal Code (Tent. Draft
No.9, May 8, 1959) § 201.2, comment 4 at pp. 37-39; Report
of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Cmd. No.
8932, at pp. 34-43,45 (1949-1953); 3 Stephen, History of the
Criminal Law of England 57-58, 74-75 (1883); Packer, The
Case for Revision of the Penal Code, 13 Stan.L.Rev. 252,
259; Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts
of Others, 105 U.Pa.L.Rev. 50; 66 Yale L.J. 427.)8 [12] Although it is the law in this state (Pen. Code, § 189), it should
not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve. Accordingly, for a defendant to be guilty
of murder under the felony-murder rule the act ·of killing
must be committed by the defendant or by his accomplice
acting in furtherance of their common design. (Common~
wealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541 [83 Am. Dec. 705]; Butler
v. People, 125 Ill. 641 [18 N.E. 338, 8 Am.St.Rep. 423];
Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97 [88 S.W. 1085, 2 L.R.A.
N.S. 719, 123 .Am. St. Rep. 189, 11 Ann. Cas. 1024] ; State v ..
Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658 [122 S.E. 568]; see also People v.
Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 597 [265 P. 230].) Language in People
v. Harrison, 176 Cal.App.2d 330 [1 Cal.Rptr. 414], inconsistent with this holding, is disapproved.
[18] On his appeAl from the robbery conviction, defendant contends that he did not participate in the robbery. He
testified that on the evening of the robbery be was with Ball
and a man named Johnson. He did not know that they
intended to commit robbery. He was "pretty drunk" at
the time and fell asleep in the automobile. When he awoke
the automobile was parked near Carpenter's gasoline station,
8The felony·murder rule has been abolished in England (English
Homicide Act, § 1, 1957, 5 & 6 EIiz. II, c. 11), and has been converted
to a rebuttable presumption of malice by the Model Penal Code. (Model
Pen. Code (Tent. Draft No.9, May 8, 19(9) 1201.2.)
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and Ball and Johnson were absent. He left the automobile
to look for them. As he approached the station, Johnson
ran from the vault. Carpenter shot just as Johnson ducked
around a corner and dropped the moneybag. Carpenter's
bullet hit defendant who fell wounded near the bag that
Johnson had dropped.
Defendant's testimony was corroborated by the testimony
of James Johnson, an inmate of the state prison for an unrelated crime at the time of defendant's trial. Johnson testified that he was the man who ran from the vault with the
moneybag. Carpenter controverted their testimony, however, by identifying defendant as the man who ran from the
vault. The evidence is therefore sufficient to support defendant's conviction of robbery.
[14] Defendant contends, however, that the trial court
on its own motion should have instructed the jury to view _
Carpenter's testimony with caution on the ground that it
tended to be self-serving because ICarpenter "was relieved
of any criminal or civil responsibility for the shootings by
implicating [defendant] and the deceased in an attempted
robbery." All testimony that favors a witness' real or imagined self-interest, however, does not require a cautionary
instruction. The testimony of a robbery victim does not come
from a "tainted source" as does the testimony of an accomplice (People v. Robinson, 43 Cal.2d 132, 141 [271 P.2d 865] ;
-People v. Wallin, 32 Cal.2d 803, 808 [197 P.2d 734]; Code
Civ. Proc., § 2061, subd. 4), nor is his testimony like that of
.8 complaining witness in a sex offense, which may be moti-vated by malice and beyond effective contradiction because
it relates to matters that ordinarily take place in secrecy.
-(People v. Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885, 891-892 [129 P.2d 367].)
In the present case, there was no such danger of perjury, and defendant had a fair opportunity to controvert the
witness' testimony. The court properly instructed the jury
that they were the exclusive judges of the credibility of the
witnesses and informed them that they might consider such
matters as the relation of the witnesses to the case and their
interest therein. Although the court could have made
, 'such comment on the evidence and tlle testimony and
credibility of any witness as in its opinion [was J necessary
for the proper determination of the case . . . " (Pen. Code,
§ 1127), it was not required to give a cautionary instruction.
The judgment is affirmed as to defendant's conviction of

/
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first degree robbery and .reversed as to his conviction of
first degree murder.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., and White, J.,. concurred.
BURKE, J.-I dissent. The unfortunate effect of the decision of the majority in this case is to advise felons:
"Henceforth in committing certain crimes, including robbery, rape and burglary, you are free to arm yourselves with
a gun and brandish it in the faces of your victims without
fear of a murder conviction unless you or your accomplice
pulls the trigger. If the menacing effect of your gun causes
a victim or policeman to fire and kill an innocent person or
.a cofelon, you are absolved of responsibility for such killing
unless you shoot first."
Obviously this advance judicial absolution removes one
of the most meaningful deterrents to the commission of
armed felonies.
.
In the present case defendant's accomplice was killed when
the robbery victim fired after the accomplice had pointed 8.
revolver at him. In People v. Harr2~son (1959) 176 Cal.App.
2d 330 [1 Cal.Rptr. 414] (hearing in Supreme Court denied
without a dissenting vote), the rationale of which the majority now disapprove, the robbery victim was himself accidentally killed by a shot fired by his employee after defendant
robbers had opened fire, and the robbers were· held guilty
of murder for the killing. The majority now attempt to distinguish Harrison on the ground that there the robbers "initiated" the gun battle; in the present case the victim fired
the first shot. As will appear, any such purported distinction
is an invitation to further armed crimes of violence. There
is DO room in the law for sporting considerations and distinctions as to who fired ·first when dealing with killings
which are caused by the actions of felons in deliberately
arming themselves to commit any of the heinous crimes listed
in Penal Code section 189. If a victim--or someone defending the victim-seizes an opportunity to shoot first when
confronted by robbers with a deadly weapon (real or simulated), any "gun battle" is initiated by the armed robbers.
In such a situation application of the felony-murder rule of
section 189 of the Penal Code supports, if not compels, the
conclusion that the surviving robbers committed murder
even if the lethal bullet did not come from one of their guns,
·Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign·
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.

I
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and whether it is an innocent person or an accomplice who
dies.
Section 187 of the Penal Code declares that "Murder is
the unlawful[I] killing of a human being, with malice aforethought. " Section 188 states that "Such malice may be
express or implied. It is express when there is manifested
a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away ... life.... It
is implied ... when the circumstances attending the killing
show an abandoned and malignant heart."
Section 189 specifies that" All murder which is perpetrated
by ... any ... kind of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing, or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt
to perpetrate ... robbery [or five other named felonies 2 ], is
murder of the first degree.... "
So heinous has the Legislature considered murders in the
perpetration of these offenses that it grouped them with
murder by means of poison, lying in wait or by torture, and,
fundamentally, the law in this respect has remained unchanged for more than one hundred years. (Stats. 1850,
p. 231; Stats. 1856, p. 219; now Pen. Code, § 189.)
In People v. Milton (1904) 145 Cal. 169, 171-172 [78 P. 549],
the court pointed out that a killing is unlawful which is
"perpetrated in the performance or attempt to perform one
of these felonies, and the malice of the abandoned and malignant heart is shown from the very nature of the crime" the
defendant is attempting to commit: Thus the killing is established as murder under section 187, in the light of the definition of malice found in section 188, and section 189 makes
it first degree murder. Therefore, held the court, even if the
killing be accidental or unintentional, if committed in tIle
attempt to perpetrate one of the felonies named in section
189 it is first degree murder.
This principle has been repeatedly upheld by this court
(see People v. Raber (1914) 168 Cal. 316, 318 [143 P. 317] ;
People v. Witt (1915) 170 Cal. 104, 107-108 [148 P. 928] ;
People v. Denman (1918) 179 Cal. 497, 498-499 [177 P. 461] ;
People v. Boss (1930) 210 Cal. 245, 249 [290 P. 881] ; People
v. Valentine (1946) 28 Ca1.2d 121, 135 [169 P.2d 1] ; People
v. Coeft,eld (1951) 37 Ca1.2d 865,868 [236 P.2d 570]), and is
expressly recognized by the majority in the instant case with
the declaration (ante, p. 781) that "inadvertent or acci-

!

II.e., not excusable (§ 195) or justifiable (§§ 196, 197).
2I.e., arson, rape, burglary, mayllem, or allY act punishable under
eection 288 (lewd or lascivious acts against children).

)
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dental killings are first degree murders when committed by
felons in the perpetration of robbery." (Italics added.) The
majority further expressly recognize the rule (ante, pp. 781782) that" A defendant need not do the killing himself . . .
to be guilty of murder. . . . All persons aiding and abetting
the commission of a robbery are guilty of first degree murder
when one of them kills" in the perpetration of the robbery.
(See People v. Boss, supra.)
Despite these declared principles-long established and
effective in their deterrence of crimes of violence-the majority now announce (ante, p. 781) that "When a killing is
not committed by a robber or by his accomplice but by his
victim, malice aforethought is not attributable to the robber,
for the killing is not committed by him in the perpetration
or attempt to perpetrate robbery. It is not enough that the
killing was a risk reasonably to be foreseen .. ,. Section 189
requires that the felon or his accomplice commit the killing,
for if he does not, the killing is not committed to perpetrate
the felony.... To include such killings within section 189
would expand the meaning of the words' murder . . , which is
committed in the perpetration." [of] robbery,.,' beyond
common understanding." (Italics added.)
But section 189 carries not the least suggestion of a requirement that the killing must take place to perpetrate the felony.
If that requirement now be read into the section by the majority, then what becomes of the rule-which they purport
to recognize-that an accidental and unintentional killing
falls within the section' How can it be said that such a
killing takes place to perpetrate a robbery'
.
Moreover, as already noted, the malice aforethought of
the abandoned and malignant heart is shown from the very
nature of the crime, here armed robbery, the defendant is
attempting to commit. (People v. Milton (1904) supra, 145
Cal. 169, 171-172.) This truism was confirmed in People v.
Bostic (1914) 167 Cal. 754, 761 [14P. 380], wherein the
court pointed out that the argument that to be first degree
murder a killing during robbery must be planned as a part
of the scheme, carries its own refutation, "for it must be
apparent that without reference to the robbery such a murder
would be a 'wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing,' "
and hence, first degree murder; further, said the court, "The
moment [defendant] entered that [train] car with a deadly
weapon in his hand, with the purpose of committing robbery,
the law fixed upon him the intent which would make any
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killing in the perpetration of the robbery or in the attempt ...
a murder of the tirst degree. In such cases the law does not
measure the delicate scruples of the robber with reference to
shooting his victim." Again in PeopZe v. Coefield, supra (1951)
37 Cal.2d 865, 868 [2] the court took note of the rule
. "that when one enters a place with a deadly weapon for the
purpose of committing robbery, malice is shown by the nature
of the attempted crime." This is also the approach of the
general felony-murder doctrine, a doctrine which (the majority confirm) ascribes malice aforethought where the killing is in the perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony.
As expressed in People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 795
[36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 P .2d 892], cited by the majority, "A
homicide that is a direct causal result of the commission of a
felony inherently dangerous to human lIfe (other than the six
felonies enumerated in Pen. Code, sec. 189) constitutes at
least second degree murder. [Citations.]" (Italics added.)
\ A homicide which arises out of an attempt at armed robbery
is a direct causal result of the chain of events set in motion
by the robbers when they undertook their felony. When a
victim tires the lethal bullet, whether or not he fires first,
the killing is caused by the act of the felon and the felon is
88 responsible therefor 88 when the firing is by his accomplice
or when it is accidental or unintentional. S The majority suggest (ante, p. 782), ",it is unnecessary to imply malice
by invoking the felony-murder doctrine" where the robber
,"initiates" a gun battle by shooting first. This suggestion by
the majority, I respectfully submit, emphasizes the inconsistency of their opinion. First they declare (ante, p. 781) that
"When a killing is fiDt committed by a robber ... but by his
victim, malice aforethought is not attributabZe to the robber,
for the killing is not committed by him in ... robbery." (Italics added.) Later they state (ante, p. 782) that "Defendants
who initiate gun battles may also be found guilty of murder
if their victims resist and kill . . . and it is unnecessary to
imply malice by invoking the felony-murder doctrine." (Italics added.)

)

. ../

SIt should be noted that the doctrine of proximate causation has not
been confined to civil eases. In People v. Mon1c (1961) 56 Ca1.2d 288,
296 [14 CalRptr. 633, 363 P.2d 865J, for example, the defendant made
threats of serious bodily harm to a person whom he had kidnaped for
purposes of robbery, and the threats caused her to jump from an automobile and receive injuries. This court held that the doctrine of proximate
causation was applicable, that the victim bad suffered "hodily harm"
within the meaning of Penal Code section 209, and that the penalty of
d~ath was proper.
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But malice aforethought is an essential element of murder.
(Pen. Code, § 187.) If it is not attributable to the robber
when a killing is "committed by" his victim rather than by
himself in a gun battle initiated by the robber, is the essential malice express--or is it to be implied under some doctrine
other than the felony-murder rule' Do the majority imply
the malice of the abandoned and malignant heart (Pen.
Code, § 188) only if the robber shoots first, but not if he
merely creates the foreseeable risk that "the victim will resist
and kill" f .And this despite the fact that, as the majority
further affirm (ante, p. 781), "the robbery might therefore
be regarded as a proximate cause of the killing'"
Even if, as the majority suggest (ante, p. 782), it is unnecessary to imply malice by invoking the felony-murder
doctrine where the robber shoots first, that doctrine can
and should be invoked i,n a case in which, as here, a
robber with a gun in his hand confronts a victim who can
and does resist by firing the first shot. In such a case, the
robber "initiated" the criminal plan, he "initiated" it by
wilfully, maliciously and wantonly putting the victim in fear
of his life, and he "initiated" any resultant shooting, whether
by his gun or that of the victim. Where the victim is in a
position to shoot first and his bullet kills, the killing should
be viewed in law and in fact as having been "committed"
by the robber (as it was in People v. Harrison, supra, 176
Cal.App.2d 330), and application of the felony-murder rule
to such circumstances is, in my view, exactly the sort of
"rational function that it is designed to serve' '-in the
-phrasing of the majority (ante, p. 783).
Extreme examples may be imagined in which the application of a rule of criminal liability would appear manifestly
unjust. However, when this court and others have been faced
with such aD example exceptions have been made to avoid
an unconscionable result. To reject invocation of the felonymurder rule here, as do the majority (ante, pp. 782-783),
because of possible harshness in its application in other circumstances, for example, to fleeing robbers who are not armed,
dilutes the enforcement of criminal responsibility. The case
anticipated and the injustice sought to be protected against
by the majority are not before us, and can best be dealt with
when and if encountered. It may be observed, however, that
robbers are not compelled to flee and thus to be shot at endangering themselves and others. They need only surrender,
as many have done, to avoid death, to themselves or others,
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and the awesome penalties which attach under the felonY-1
murder l a w . - ;
I agree with the majority (ante, p. 781) that one purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing
negligently or accidentally. However, another equally cogent
purpose is to deter them from undertaking inherently dangerous felonies in which, as the majority state (an-te, p.
781), a "killing was a risk reasonably to be foreseen.
. .. In every robbery there is a possibility that the victim will
resist and kill." As declared in People v. Chavez (1951) 87
Ca1.2d 656, 669 [284 P.2d 682], "The statute [Pen. Code,
§ 189] was adopted for the protection of the community and
its residents, not for the benefit of the lawbreaker." Wby a·
felon who has undertaken an armed robbery, which this court
now expressly notifies him carries a "risk" and "a possibility that the victim will resist and kill," and which "might
therefore be regarded as a proximate cause of the killing"
should nevertheless be absolved because, fortuitously, the victim can and does shoot first and the lethal bullet comes from
the victim's gun rather than from his own, will be beyond
the comprehension of the. average law-abiding citizen, to say
nothing of that of victims of armed robbery. Nor is such a
view compatible with the felony-murder doctrine.
But, say the majority, "The robber has little control over
such a killing once the robbery is undertaken," and "To impose an additional penalty for the killing would discriminate
between robbers, not on the basis of any difference in their
own conduct, but solely on the basis of the response by others
that the robber's conduct happened to induce." (An-te,
p. 781). A robber has n.o control over a bullet sent on its
way after he pulls the trigger. Certainly his inability to
recall it before it kills does not cloak him with innocence
of the homicide. The truth is, of course, that the robber may
exercise various "controls over" a possible killing from his
victim's bullet" once the robbery is undertaken. " The robber
can drop his own weapon, he can refrain from using it, he can
surrender. Other conduct can be suggested which would
tend to reassure the victim and dissuade him from firing his
own gun. Moreover, the response by one victim will lead to
capture of the robbers, while that of another victim will permit
their escape. Is the captured felon to be excused from responsibility for his crime, ill order not to "discriminate between robbers ... solely on the basis of the response by others
that the robber's conduct happened to induce"!
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The robber's conduct which forms the basis of his criminal
responsibility is the undertaking of the armed felony, in
which a "killing was a risk reasonably to be foreseen" including the "possibility that the victim will resist and kill."
If that risk becomes reality and a killing occurs, the guilt
for it is that of the felon. And when done, it is murder
in the first degree-calling for death or life imprisonment.
And to say that the knowledge that this awesome, sobering,
terrifying responsibility of one contemplating the use of a
deadly weapon in the perpetration of one of the listed offenses
is not the strongest possible deterrent to the commission of
such offenses belies what is being demonstrated day after
day in the criminal departments of our trial courts.
I would hold, in accord with the rationale of People v. Harrison, supra (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 330, that the killing is
that of the felon whether or not the lethal bullet comes from
his gun or that of his accomplice and whether or not one of
them shoots first, and would affirm the judgment of conviction of murder in the instant case.
McComb, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied June 23,
1965. Mosk, J., did not participate therein. McComb J., and
Burke, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be
granted.
.

